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Abstract 
 
This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional 
framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties 
with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory 
for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy 
outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin 
America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable 
conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient 
outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 
'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework 
for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding 
the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different 
decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be 
testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical  work. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The effectiveness of policy decision-making and the social satisfaction with its outcomes in 
regimes based upon divided powers between the President and the Congress have been 
submitted to critical scrutiny and have been the subject of controversial statements.1 This 
paper holds that legislators' individual freedom at voting and multipartism are favorable 
institutional conditions for effective decision-making and collectively satisfactory policy 
outcomes. More precisely, the formal analysis here developed supports the hypothesis that, 
in a situation of divided government, legislators with no party discipline –a setting similar 
to the United States— tend to produce more collectively satisfactory outcomes than 
multiparty systems with strong disciplined parties at voting --a feature more common, for 
instance, in some Latin American presidential democracies. Against some other previous 
sketches, it is also found that a two-party system with strong party discipline tends to 
produce less satisfactory outcomes than any of the two settings previously considered. 
Incentives for party indiscipline at voting could thus be conceived as f avoring effective and 
satisfactory institutional decision-making. The reduction of political pluralism to 
adversarial bipartism, in contrast, should be regarded as a source of ineffectiveness and 
unsatisfactory outcomes.  
The argument does not imply a generally favorable judgment of party indiscipline 
that should be extended to any institutional context. Actually, a Congress dominated by 
individuals' preferences and voting decisions is likely to focus on narrow issues, localistic 
interests or logrolling of private favors, rather than on the provision of large -group public 
goods. Multipartism, in contrast, can be a better feature if it reflects appropriately the 
pluralism of citizens' preferences and relevant issues in the society. However, this article 
does not discuss this kind of desirable properties, but only the collective utility of decisions 
made by political representatives through inter-institutional cooperation. 
The point is that if all legislators' preferences are aggregated into only two parties 
and these enforce strong internal discipline at voting, the resulting two policy preferences to 
deal with will be significantly distant from each other and the legislators will be 
'entrenched' around them. Logically, in a Congress with only two disciplined parties 
decisions can only be made through hard-won unanimity agreements between two distant 
policy positions. Then it can be expected that confrontational and adversarial politics may 
prevail, parties can be able to block each other and, as a result, there can be stable 
unsatisfactory policies on many issues in spite of the existence of a legislative majority 
favoring policy change –the usual negative meaning of 'gridlock'. It is in this context of 
bipartism --and paraphrasing a well-known saying on corruption regarding government in 
general-- that party indiscipline can be seen as the grease that oils the wheels of divided 
government. 2 
The following analysis can be relevant for understanding different levels of 
effective decision-making and social satisfaction with institutional policy outcomes in 
different presidential regimes, especially comparing the United States with other countries, 
as well as for the design of institutions and rules fostering good democratic governance. I 
now provide a framework for analysis which may induce significant revisions of empirical 
data according to innovative categories. The model allows us to identify implications on the 
expected effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different 
decision rules, the number of parties and institutional rules promoting more or les strong 
party discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and 
empirical  work. 
Basically, what is presented here is a formal model of policy decision-making in an 
institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal 
political parties with voting discipline. Previous analyses of institutional factors of 
decision-making under divided government either have built formal models based on some 
peculiar characteristics of the United States institutional system or have developed a more 
informal discussion of alternative institutional formulas that can be found elsewhere. Here I 
draw upon one of the formal, parsimonious modeling that better fits the U.S. case, which 
derives from the pivotal actors theory as originally presented by Keith Krehbiel (1996, 
1998; for extensions assuming imperfect information, see Cameron 2000). But regarding 
the original model, some of the decision rules are changed and, especially, the assumption 
that political party organizations are not highly constraining so as to allow individual 
pivotal legislators to vote according to their preferences is replaced with the assumption 
that disciplined political parties play a crucial role at selecting policy positions and voting. 3 
With these alternative assumptions it is possible  to approach some of the 
characteristics that can be more frequently found in most presidential regimes outside the 
United States. In particular, the assumption of individual legislators with high freedom to 
vote on their own can be more realistic for settings with elections in single member districts 
or with high intra-party competition among individual candidates, like in the United States, 
while the assumption of party discipline seems more realistic when representatives are 
elected by proportional representation and closed party lists. Factors of party discipline may 
include the degree in which the central party leadership controls the use of the party label, 
the selection of candidates and their place in electoral lists, as proposed by Mainwaring and 
Shugart (1997). But the degree of central party control can also be considered to be an 
intermediate variable, which may depend to some extent on the degree of restriction that 
the electoral system imposes on the variety of potential divisive issues in the society and of 
citizens' preferences. In a highly complex society like the United States, a very restrictive 
electoral system based on single member districts with plurality rule has produced a very 
low number of parties which have developed low internal cohesion. Then, the members of 
Congress can be located –at least to the effects of analysis-- along a continuum of 
individual preferences. In contrast, in other societies elections by party list proportional 
representation tend to permit a variable number of parties with higher internal cohesion, 
whose members can keep higher discipline in Congress. 4 
The analysis here presented focuses on the relative collective utility that different 
policy outcomes derived from different institutional rules and political party configurations 
tend to produce. A number of formal findings allow us to identify some key institutional 
and political conditions in which efficient equilibrium outcomes can be expected, as well as 
to explain relatively bad performances of policy decision-making in situations of divided 
government when strong party discipline exists. Specifically, policy decision-making in 
divided government when only two disciplined parties are pivotal appears to be more prone 
to produce collectively inefficient outcomes in equilibrium than under the assumption that 
party discipline does not matter. With democratic party discipline, only a high number of 
parties is able to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient 
outcomes. In other words, under conditions of strong party voting discipline, multi-party 
systems can produce better policy decisions that two party systems, although not as good as 
those made in institutional settings in which political party discipline is weak or inexistent.  
  
 
2. The basic model 
 
The basic elements of the formal model to be developed are decision rules and pivotal 
actors. In the present version, they are the following: 
 
* Decision rules: 
In order to approve a bill, the process of decision making include the following steps. 
- A bill can be initially approved by simple majority of the members of the unicameral 
Congress, typically around the position preferred by the median legislator in case of no 
party constraints or around the median party preference when parties are disciplined. I call 
'median party' the congressional disciplined party containing the median legislator and thus 
able to attract a majority of legislators in favor of its proposal. 5  
- The President may veto the bill. 
- The Congress can override the presidential veto by some qualified majority rule. (The 
most typical override rule is 2/3, but other rules, such as 3/5 or the requirement of qualified 
majorities in two chambers, also exist in some countries). 6 
 These rules imply that the Congress has no restrictions on amendments. Thus, the 
basic model to be developed can be enlightening regarding equilibrium outcomes for both 
ordinary legislation typically initiated by the Congress, the congressional discussion of 
presidential initiatives, and even legislative presidential decrees submitted to further 
congressional approval (in the latter case with some caveats regarding the effects of timing 
on the further location of the status quo after the decree is enforced). A common feature in 
all these procedures is that they allow the Congress to present, revise or reshape the bill 
according to the preference of the median legislator or the median party. The agenda setter 
is thus not relevant for the policy position which is going to be approved in equilibrium 
under the above mentioned set of rules and will not be included in the following 
discussion.7  
 * Pivotal actors: 
As mentioned, I will compare results based on two alternative assumptions regarding 
pivotal actors: whether they can be individuals or disciplined political parties. If it is 
assumed that individuals vote according to their preferences, the pivotal actors for the 
above mentioned decision rules are:  
- The Median legislator. 
- The President. 
- The Veto legislator.  
The latter is the one that, by tipping on the side of the presidential veto, can prevent 
congressional override (the veto legislator should have a number of legislators on the 
President's side equals to one minus the override rule; for instance, under the 2/3 override 
rule, the veto legislator is the one with 1/3 of legislators on the President's side). 
 The alternative assumption of party discipline implies that the pivotal actors are the 
congressional parties, that is, groups of members of Congress with relatively close, 
contiguous preferences on the policy space that accept to act as a single actor 
(congressional groups of this kind are typically called 'bancadas' in Latin American 
Congresses). In the model, it is assumed that they work with what could be called 
democratic discipline, which requires two conditions: first, each congressional party makes 
an internally democratic decision on which policy preference to adopt, which typically 
corresponds to the preference of the party's median member; second, all party members 
vote according to the preference that has been adopted. 8 
According to the assumptions of party democratic discipline, the pivotal actors are 
the following: 
- The Median party, that is, the party containing the median legislator. Under the above 
assumptions, the Median party's preference will be the one of the median party's member; 
in other words, the preference of the median legislator's party median member. 
- The President's party, whose preference will be the one of the presidential party's median 
member. This may coincide or not with the President's preference as far as the members of 
the President's party, even if they are closer to the President's preference than to any other 
party's, have sufficient opportunities to adopt a collective preference by internal discussion 
and voting and to present the corresponding bills and amendments. 
- The Veto party, that is, the party containing the veto legislator, whose preference can be 
referred to as the veto legislator's party median member's. 
 
The model adopts the standard assumptions that all policy preferences can be 
located on a single-dimensional space, individual preferences are single-peaked and 
symmetric (so that individual utility decreases monotonically with the distance from 
individual's preference to the different policy positions), and actors have perfect 
information (and so no significant bargaining or other transaction costs are included in their 
decision functions).  
In particular, the assumption of a single policy dimension has the important 
advantage of simplicity and readability without necessarily implying major losses in 
realism. According to some available empirical analyses, even in the U.S. Congress a single 
dimension can account for most of the variance in legislators' roll call voting (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997, Cameron 2000). In spite of the absence of comparable data and analyses 
for congressional voting in other presidential regimes, it may be reasonable to assume that 
single-dimensionality can be stronger in multi-party systems with ideologically-oriented, 
disciplines parties than in the individually-driven U.S. Congress. Typically, a single 
ideological dimension, such as the left-right axis, contains multiple issues with disparate 
actors' preferences. As different agenda-setter models suggest, each party can choose to 
give salience or legislative priority to those issues on which it can expect to be able to adopt 
an advantageous position. But disciplined political parties rarely leapfrog each other, by 
this way establishing a linear continuum among them. Nevertheless, the present assumption 
of uni-dimensionality could be modified if empirical observation suggested that 
multidimensionality can be relevant. (For a set of estimate party relative positions on a left-
right single dimension, see Castles and Mair 1984, Huber and Inglehart 1995). 
 The following analysis focuses on the set of outcomes in equilibrium, or 
'equilibrium set', and their collective efficiency as can be measured by their distance to the 
median legislator. The 'equilibrium set' is what Krehbiel and other authors using this kind 
of models have called 'gridlock interval' or similar expressions, but I want to avoid to focus 
on 'stalemate', 'deadlock' or 'gridlock' because the main interest of this paper is not whether 
policy stability is always better or worse than policy change, as it does not focus either on 
the process of inter-institutional conflict or bargaining. In the present approach, policy 
stability or 'gridlock' can be as good or as bad as policy change or instability depending on 
the utility or satisfaction that the corresponding outcomes can produce among the voters.  
I adopt here the straightforward criterion that the most satisfactory outcomes are 
those that correspond to the median voter's preference, whatever the distribution of voters' 
preferences along the policy space. This is based upon the mathematical property that the 
median position minimizes the sum of the distances from all the other positions or 
preferences, which can be considered to be equivalent to the proposition that the median 
position maximizes collective satisfaction or the sum of individuals' satisfactions. (For the 
criterion of socia l utility based on closeness to the median voter's preference, see Davis, 
Hinich and Ordeshook 1970, Huber and Powell 1994, Hinich and Munger 1997, Powell 
2000, Colomer 2001).  
The outcomes to be found in equilibrium under different institutional settings and 
political party configurations will thus be discussed for their relative closeness to the 
median legislator's and the median party's preferences. I focus on the 'equilibrium set' (or 
'gridlock interval') because it contains all the stable outcomes that can be achieved through 
a more or less long, more or less costly process of institutional decision-making. Then, 
socially satisfactory outcomes may be the result of either policy stability or policy change, 
as may unsatisfactory outcomes also be, depending on the locations of the initial status quo 
and the further outcome. 
The reader should, however, keep always in mind that this is only a calculus of 
'collective' utility based on political representatives' preferences. It is extremely important 
to note that the degree of correspondence between the political representatives' preferences 
and those of the voters, and in particular whether the median legislator's or the president's 
preferences correspond or not to the one of the median voter, highly depends on the 
electoral system, which is not explicitly included in the present model. Actually, it can be 
held that U.S.-type congressional electoral systems based upon single member districts and 
plurality rule with mal-apportionment and gerrymandering, features that are also partly 
reproduced in the U.S. -type presidential electoral college, tend to create more distance 
between the median legislator's or the president's preference and the median voter's 
preference than most electoral systems based on large distric ts with proportional 
representation or other inclusive electoral rules. 'Collective' utility as based upon political 
representatives' preferences should not thus be equated at all with 'social' utility based upon 
voters' preferences without accounting for the effects of the electoral system. I will be back 
to this in the final section of this paper. 
 
 
3. Revising the non-party pivotal actors model 
 
The non-party pivotal actors model, as initially developed by Krehbiel for the analysis of 
the United States institutional process, can be revised and discussed as follows. First, it 
should be noted that under the assumptions of Krehbiel's original non-party pivotal actors 
model, presidential unified government strictu senso never exists. Even if the President has 
many supporters --that is, many legislators that can be relatively close to the presidential 
preference--, the President will always have to bargain an intermediate outcome with the 
Median legislator and the Veto legislator, who are not submitted to any collective discipline 
even if they belong to the President's party. 9 
Thus, party indiscipline always produces some kind of divided government in which 
intermediate compromises between the three pivotal actors can be achieved. As will be 
discussed immediate ly, the expected outcomes are the following. First, the Median 
legislator's preference if the decision is made from an initial status quo which is located on 
distant positions and is highly unsatisfactory for all three actors. Second, a relatively small 
and moderate 'equilibrium set' including non-median outcomes if the decision is made from 
some relatively less distant, less unsatisfactory initial status quos. The non-median 
equilibrium outcomes can be considered to be relatively moderate and satisfactory because 
they are located between the Median legislator's preference and either the Veto legislator's 
preference or the President's preference (the closer of these two actors to the median 
legislator).  
 
------------------  Figure 1 about here 
 The corresponding formal model is presented in Figure 1. The horizontal axis 
represents all policy positions on which the status quo policy and the actors' preferences 
can be located –let's assume, for instance, that values close to zero represent leftist policy 
preferences while high values represent rightist ones. The President (P), the Veto legislator 
(V) and the Median legislator (MeL) are represented as different points along the axis so as 
P < V < MeL. Of course, inverse relative positions (assuming, for instance, that the 
President is the most rightwing of the pivotal actors) would produce analogous results in 
the following analysis.  
The vertical axis indicates the outcomes that will be achieved by a process of 
decision-making according to the rules above presented from different initial status quos 
along the horizontal axis. Specifically, from any status quo located on the right of the 
Median legislator, the outcome will be the Median legislator's preference, since he will 
have the opportunity to present the corresponding bill, there will be a clear majority 
supporting the move, and the other pivotal actors will also increase their satisfaction with 
the new policy so they will not vetoed it. This result is indicated by the flat line in Interval 
IV placed at the level of the Median legislator's preference on the vertical axis.  
From other initial status quos, the Veto legislator plays a more active pivotal role. 
The intervals separated by vertical lines in the graph are built upon symmetric distances 
from the Veto legislator to the Median legislator. It is supposed that the Veto legislator is 
indifferent to policies located at the same distance from his preference on any of the two 
sides of the policy spectrum. Thus, from an initial status quo located on the far left of the 
spectrum, the Veto legislator will be better off with a bill corresponding to the Median 
legislator's preference and will not support the hypothetical presidential veto (this, if it 
happened, would be override). This is valid until the point in which the status quo lies on 
the same distance to the Veto legislator from the left as his distance to the bill proposed by 
the Median legislator, as indicated by the flat line section in Interval I on the left of the 
graph.  
In contrast to the collectively efficient outcomes corresponding to the Median 
legislators' preference that can be expected from the just identified two extreme sets of 
status quos, from more moderate initial status quos located around the Veto legislator's 
preference the outcomes will be different. The Veto legislator is indifferent to symmetric 
points around his preference, as mentioned, so he can accept symmetric transfers from any 
status quo located on his left to a new outcome located at the same distance on his right as 
can be proposed by the Median legislator. Many of these proposals may be vetoed by the 
President, but the Veto legislator and the legislators on his right will be able to override the 
presidential veto. The corresponding outcomes are represented by the decreasing line in 
Interval II on the left of the Veto legislator.  
Finally, from status quos located between the Veto legislator and the Median 
legislator, policy change is not feasible. Any move from any of these points to the right will 
have a majority support but will be vetoed by the President and have the support of the 
Veto legislator so that the veto will not be override. The corresponding outcomes in 
equilibrium, or equilibrium set, is represented by the thick increasing line in Interval III. 
 
The above analysis is somehow a simplified version of the one presented by 
Krehbiel in his original pivotal actors model. I am, however, interested in measuring the 
size of the equilibrium set (or gridlock interval) in order to evaluate the collective 
efficiency of the policy outcomes of this process. As have been seen, from many initial 
status quos corresponding to the preferences of a majority of legislators, collectively 
efficient outcomes corresponding to the Median legislator's preference are achieved in 
equilibrium. The non-median outcomes that are achieved from less unsatisfactory initial 
status quos are located between the Median legislator's and the Veto legislator's 
preferences. So assuming that proportions of legislators' preferences can be counted along 
the horizontal axis, from zero on the left to one on the extreme right, the 'size' of the 
equilibrium set including all stable policy outcomes will be:  
 
Equilibrium set = MeL – V 
where: 
MeL: Median legislator's preference; 
V: Veto legislator's preference. 
 
Proposition 1. Under the assumption of no party discipline, the equilibrium set, or 
set of stable outcomes, includes all the policy preferences between the Median legislator's 
and the Veto legislator's. 
For alternative locations of the pivotal actors implying that the Median legislator is 
closer to the President than to the Veto legislator, it would be sufficient to substitute the 
President for the Veto legislator, so that the size of the equilibrium set would be the 
distance between MeL and P. 
For symmetric locations of the actors, so that P and V would be on the right of MeL, 
the size of the equilibrium set = 1 – V – MeL. 
 
Illustrations. For the typical override rule of 2/3 or .66, V = 1/3 or .33, and the size 
of the equilibrium set = .50 - .33 = .16. In other words, the maximum policy distance 
between the outcomes that can be expected in equilibrium in a non-party Congress 
submitted to 2/3 override rule and the collectively efficient median legislator's preference 
encompasses only one sixth of the legislators' preferences.  
For lower override rules, such as for example, 3/5 or .60, the size of the equilibrium 
set = .10. This is a smaller size of possible outcomes in equilibrium than with the 2/3 rule, 
which suggests that, under a less demanding override rule, relatively more efficient policies 
located at less distance from the Median legislator's preference will be approved and be 
stable.  
In the limit, if the rule to override the presidential veto were just a simple majority 
of legislators (as is the case in a few countries), the Veto legislator would coincide with the 
Median legislator. As a consequence, all possible presidential vetoes would be override and 
only the Median legislator's preference would become stable policy in equilibrium. In other 
words, with a simple majority override rule, the presidential veto can vanish, so as to make 
the President a non-pivotal actor and the legislative decision system close to a 
parliamentary one. We'll take these measurements as comparative references for results of 
alternative models based on the assumption that legislators are submitted to party 
discipline. 
 
In the light of the analysis just presented, in the non-party model of policy decision 
making in divided government optimum results could only be achieved if the President's 
preference was exactly the same as the Median legislator's. This makes the system of 
separation of powers inferior to the ideal model of parliamentary regime based on 
proportional representation, in which the Median legislator would correspond to the Median 
voter's preference and would always be included in a majority parliamentary decision. But, 
globally, the equilibrium outcomes that have been identified for a non-party institutional 
framework of separation of powers can be considered to be relatively satisfactory, since 
they either coincide with the Median legislator's preference or are located within a 
relatively small set of moderate preferences.  
In this light, some claims for rejecting the acceptability of policy decisions made by 
inter-institutional processes such as those here stylized might be overstated, at least in 
comparison with some of the results to be found in other institutional settings of separation 
of powers such as those that will be discussed below. Underlying motivations for globa lly 
negative evaluations of the outcomes corresponding to the U.S. -like non-party model here 
presented may include a taste for non-decisive governments or a lucid awareness of the 
biases of the electoral system, or both. Indeed, to the extent that institutional pivotal actors 
are not faithfully representative of voters' preferences and their policy preferences are 
hazardous or narrowly localistic-oriented, the corresponding institutional policy decisions 
can be considered not socially satisfactory. Under those electorally based conditions, it 
might be preferable not to have an effective institutional framework for policy decision-
making (and thus praise 'gridlock' for the sake of itself). However, to the extent that the 
preferences of political representatives in the institutions corresponded to voters' 
preferences thanks to an appropriate electoral system, the non-party model here revised 
suggests that the set of policy decisions to be made in equilibrium should bring about 
relatively low levels of social dissatisfaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Introducing political parties 
 
If disciplined political parties are substituted for the individual pivotal actors previously 
considered, both the relative distances among the new pivotal actors and the corresponding 
sizes of the equilibrium set will be markedly different. Two cases can be distinguished: 
 
- Case 1. One single party contains either the President and the Median legislator, or the 
Veto legislator and the Median legislator, or the three pivotal actors. In all these situations, 
the expected outcomes are always coincident with the Median party's preference, whether it 
includes the President or not. When a Median party contains the Veto and the Median 
legislators, but not the President, the situation could be called 'unified congressional 
government'. When, in contrast, the Median legislator and the President belong to the same 
party, the President's party can reach its preferred outcomes in a similar way as it is 
supposed to occur in a situation of unified presidential government. Note that I am not 
implying here that the President's party has a majority of seats, which is usually considered 
the definition of unified government. Actually, the pivotal party only needs to be located on 
a sufficiently 'centrist' position and have more than (MeL – V) seats (e.g. for the 2/3 
override rule, one sixth of seats in Congress). What matters is the party's relative location in 
the spectrum so as to capture the key pivotal actors.  
Some of these situations may be compared with the role of minority, 'centrist' 
governments in parliamentary regimes. Although they do not have a majority parliamentary 
support, they can survive if they include the median legislator and by this way split the 
opposition parties in two non-contiguous blocs on the opposite sides of the policy spectrum 
so as to make their joint action unfeasible (as analyzed by Strom 1990). Both in 
parliamentary and presidential regimes, a minority median party can legislate with 
collective efficiency in spite of not being the majority or perhaps even not the plurality 
party in number of legislators.  
 
- Case 2. A party contains either the President or the Veto legislator (the more 'centrist' of 
these two actors) or both, while another party contains the Median legislator. This is the 
typical situation of divided government (again not identical to any situation in which no 
party, whether presidential or not, has a majority of seats). As will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs, it can be expected that, at least with two or a small number of parties, 
the distance between the Median party and the other pivotal parties will be larger than the 
distance between the pivotal actors in the previous assumption of party indiscipline. As a 
consequence, the equilibrium set will be larger and will contain more inefficient stable 
outcomes than in the previous model. 
 
--------------------   Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the results in the assumption of two disciplined parties. For the 
sake of comparing the corresponding results, the preferences of the individual actors --the 
President, the Veto legislator and the Median legislator -- are located as in the previous non-
party model. But now all of them support the preference of their party's median member, as 
the areas at the bottom of the graph suggest. Let's call the pivotal actors in this new setting 
Veto party, Vp, and Median party, Mep. As can be seen in the Figure, the Veto party's 
preference (which is the preference of the party's median member) is certainly more 
extreme than the individual Veto legislator's preference, and also, perhaps, more than the 
President's (or viceversa if the relative positions of the two actors are permuted). Likewise, 
the Median party's preference (which is the preference of the party's median member) is 
certainly more extreme than the individual Median legislator's preference. These results 
hold in the Figure for the position of the Median legislator at about half of the spectrum and 
the one of the Veto legislator as approximately corresponding to the override rule of 2/3, 
but in qualitative terms they would hold for any variant of these rules such as those above 
mentioned.  
Accordingly, the distance between the preferences of the pivotal actors is larger than 
in the non-party model. Analogously to the non-party model, and as can be seen in the 
Figure, the outcomes that can be expected in the two-party model from different status quos 
are the following: they correspond to the Median party (not the Median legislator) when the 
initial status quo is rather extreme or unsatisfactory, but now only from one of the extremes 
on the right side; they converge around the Veto party when the initial status quo is located 
on the other side; and they stay within the very large equilibrium set represented by the 
thick increasing line from a very large set of initial status quos.  
The point is that the size of the equilibrium set in this model with two disciplined 
parties is larger than in the non-party model, thus containing more inefficient outcomes 
than in the former assumption. This can be seen in Figure 2 where the dotted line represents 
the set of expected outcomes, including the equilibrium set, as found under the assumption 
of no party discipline in Figure 1. It appears clearly that, under the same decision rules and 
pivotal actors' preferences, the set of equilibrium outcomes is more inefficient when party 
discipline matters: actually, almost no outcome coincides with the Median legislator's 
preference and a large interval of outcomes is pretty far away from that collective ly 
efficient point. Now: 
 
Equilibrium set = Mep – Vp 
where: 
Mep: Median party's preference; 
Vp: Veto party's preference. 
 
Proposition 2. Under the assumption of party democratic discipline, the equilibrium 
set, or set of stable outcomes, in a two party system includes all the policy positions 
between the Median party's preference and the Veto party's preference. This set is larger 
than the distance between the Median legislator's preference and the Veto legislator's 
preference, thus containing more inefficient stable outcomes than in the assumption that 
individual actors are not submitted to party discipline. 
 
The size of the equilibrium set can be calculated more precisely. The number of 
seats of the Median party must be lower than the minimum amount of seats of the Veto 
legislator (which is one minus the override rule) and higher than half the seats: 1 – V > 
Mep seats > MeL. 
Accordingly, the preference range of the Median party is the following: 
V + (1 – V)/2 < Mep < MeL + MeL/2  
Consistently, the Veto party's number of seats must be higher than the veto rule, that 
is, one minus the override rule, and lower than half the seats: V < Vp seats < MeL. 
Accordingly, the preference range of the Veto party is: 
V/2 < Vp preference < MeL/2 
 
Now the size of the equilibrium set: Mep – Vp, can be calculated with the values of 
Mep and Vp just found. Any of the following two formulas is valid because they compare 
consistent pairs of values for each variable (minimum and maximum values for each): 
Equilibrium set = [V + (1 – V)/2] – [V/2] = 1/2 
<=> [MeL + MeL/2] – Me/2 = MeL = 1/2.  
 
It is thus found that in a two party system under the assumption of party democratic 
discipline previously presented, the size of the equilibrium set always encompasses half the 
legislators' preferences. As the previous ones, this result does not depend on the distribution 
of legislators' preferences along the policy space. With whatever distribution, the larger the 
size of the equilibrium set the higher is the proportion of potentially winning legislators' 
preferences that are away from the Median legislator's preference and, therefore, the lower 
the aggregate satisfaction with the corresponding outcomes. 
 
Illustrations. This result holds for any override rule. For instance, for the typical 2/3 
rule, the size of the equilibrium set = [.33 + (1 – .33)/2] – [.16] = .50. For the 3/5 rule, the 
size of the equilibrium set =  [.40 + (1 – .40)/2] – [.20] = .50. For the 1/2 rule, the size of 
the equilibrium set =  [.50 + (1 – .50)/2] – [.25] = .50 
 
Let's explore now in which conditions a multiparty system with party discipline can 
produce a set of equilibrium outcomes as small and efficient as the one which can be 
expected when party discipline does not matter. This is equivalent to say that the 
preferences of the new pivotal actors, the Veto party and the Median party, must coincide 
with those of the Veto legislator and the Median legislator, respectively.  
 
Proposition 3. Under the assumption of party democratic discipline, a multiparty 
system can produce outcomes as efficient as in the assumption that party discipline does not 
matter if the distance between the Median party's preference and the Veto party's preference 
is equal to or lower than half the veto rule (which is one minus the override rule).  
 
In order to calculate how many parties can be necessary to fulfill this condition, the 
reasoning is straightforward. Since the party preference is defined by its median member, 
the party encompasses the same number of legislators with preferences on the right of its 
median member as on its left. Thus, the two pivotal parties together must encompass at 
most the double of the legislators located in between the two parties' median members, 
which is equal to the veto rule (one minus the override rule).  
This result would also hold if, in contrast to the example in the Figure, the seats to 
be gathered together by the two pivotal parties were distributed unevenly between them. In 
the limit, one pivotal party could have precisely the veto rule minus one seat and the other 
pivotal party just the pivotal seat, but their total joint distance would be the same. 
 
Illustrations. For the typical 2/3 override rule, the total amount of seats of the two 
pivotal parties together must be equal or less than 1/3. This certainly leaves room for at 
least one other party on the left and one other party on the right of the pivotal parties. In this 
case, the total number of parties will be at least four.  
 
-----------------------   Figure 3 about here 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the intermediate case in which the two pivotal parties have equal size, 
1/6 of seats each or 2/6 together. In this case, 3/12 of the space lie on the left of the Veto 
party while 5/12 lie on the right of the Median party, apparently a sufficient room to allow 
other several parties to exist.  
It may be interesting to ascertain how many parties would be necessary for one of 
the pivotal parties to be the plurality party in Congress –a position which is commonly 
associated to an initiative role. The answer is that, if the two pivotal parties have similar 
sizes, as in the example in the Figure, there should be at least other five parties located on 
the two extreme sections of the spectrum (two on the left and three on the right) so as that 
no party would have more than 1/6 of seats. In total there should be at least seven parties in 
the system.  
 In other cases, the one third of seats to be gathered together by the two pivotal 
parties can be distributed unevenly between them. In the limit, one pivotal party could have 
precisely one third minus one seat and the other pivotal party just the pivotal seat. In this 
extreme case, for the larger pivotal party to be the plurality party, there should be at least 
other three parties (one on the left and two on the right) so as that no party would have 
more than 1/3 of seats. In total there should be at least five parties, including the minute 
pivotal party. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
I have presented a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional regime of 
separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting 
discipline. The model can be taken as a framework for analysis which may induce 
innovative revisions of empirical data, as well as new suggestions for institutional design. 
In this spirit, I will conclude with a few remarks on only three aspects that have been 
discussed in the paper: the concept of unified or divided government, the role of certain 
decision rules, and the consequences of the number of parties and their discipline on the 
effectiveness of policy decision-making. The examples included in the following 
paragraphs are chosen only to suggest the possibility of further empirical analyses. In future 
research, more systematic tests of the hypotheses developed here should select 
representative samples of cases, measure variables reliably, including the number of parties 
and the degrees of voting discipline, and conduct fair comparisons. 
 From the perspective provided by the pivotal actors theory, traditional distinctions 
between unified government and divided government based on whether the President's 
party has or not a majority of seats in Congress should be revised. In the assumption that 
legislators are not submitted to strong party discipline but can present bills and amendments 
and vote according to their individual preferences, unified government traditional senso 
never exists. In individually driven congresses, compromises have always to be reached 
between the President, the Veto legislator and the Median legislator in order to approve a 
bill.  
 In the alternative assumption that legislators are submitted to party discipline, a new 
type of 'quasi-unified' government can be defined which not only includes the traditional 
situation in  which the President's party has a majority of seats but any other political party 
configuration in which the President's party controls the Veto legislator and the Median 
legislator. This allows the President's party to control the outcome of the legislative process 
in equilibrium, which may be expected to lie around the preference of the party's median 
member. This situation can exist even if the President's party has just above half the 
number of seats allowing him to sustain a veto. For instance, for the usual 2/3 override rule, 
the President's party can control all legislative outcomes in a similar way as a majority 
President with only 1/6 of seats, if it is appropriately located around the 'center' of the 
policy space. 
One of the implications of these new conceptualization of unified and divided 
government is that certain empirical comparisons of relative legislative and other decision-
making performances during periods of traditionally-defined unified government and 
divided government in countries with low party discipline like the United States can be less 
interesting than previously assumed. Actually, the pivotal actors perspective can give an 
explanation to the finding that both situations tend to produce similar performances. (See 
Mayhew 1991, Fiorina 1992, Peterson and Greene 1993, Edwards, Barrett and Peake 1997, 
Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). 
In contrast, the new perspective here presented highlights the interest of comparable 
studies on relative legislative performance in presidential regimes with strong party 
discipline. But with the warning that 'unified' and 'divided' government should be defined 
according to the insights offered by the pivotal actors model, especially considering party 
relative positions on the policy spectrum. (For an example of this kind of analysis, applied 
to Mexico, see Casar 2000). 
A new situation deserves also to be identified for its likely relevant consequences on 
policy outcomes, one that can be called 'unified congressional government'. This appears 
when a single party includes the Veto and the Median legislators (with the just mentioned 
minimum amount of seats equal to half the veto rule), but not the President. This is a 
special case of divided government that can approach the more widely analyzed situation of 
centrist minority governments in parliamentary regimes. But in presidential regimes it may 
make the President extremely weak to the point to foster institutional conflicts focused on 
the President constitutional role.  
A summary survey of recent developments in present Latin American presidential 
democracies suggests, for instance, that most of the Presidents with non-party or eccentric 
allegiance and extremely small legislative support (always below the veto rule) have ended 
in institutional conflict with the Congress: either being impeached (as Collor in Brazil in 
1992 and Bucaram in Ecuador in 1997) or illegally dissolving Congress (as Fujimori in 
Peru in 1992 and Serrano in Guatemala in 1993) or resigning (as De la Rua in Argentina in 
2001). Other small minority Presidents have survived thanks to having built consistent and 
broad electoral multiparty coalitions and maintained better ideologically-defined 'centrist' 
positions in Congress, especially in Brazil. (A summary of Latin American Presidents' 
legislative support, as measured by whether the President's party had either majority or veto 
sustaining share, can be found in Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: Tables 11.1 and 11.3. For 
discussion on the case of Brazil see Mainwaring 1999, Figueiredo and Limongi 2000, 
Ames 2001). 
The consequences of different veto and override rules should also be different in 
settings with or without party discipline. When party discipline does not matter, the size of 
the equilibrium set is proportional to the threshold of the override rule. This means that, the 
higher the override rule --for instance 2/3 as compared to 3/5--, the larger the set of possible 
outcomes in equilibrium and, for the same distribution of legislators' preferences, the larger 
the distance between inefficient possible outcomes and the collectively efficient median 
legislator's preference. Other-than-veto rules able to increase the size of the equilibrium set 
can also be considered, as the filibuster cloture rule in the United States Senate included in 
Krehbiel's pivotal actors original model. Other qualified majority rules, such as the 
requirement of separate override thresholds in each of two non-congruent chambers in a 
bicameral Congress, should also be considered equivalent to increasing the override rule. 
Lower override rules can thus be advisable in order to reach more efficient outcomes. 
However, the effects of different rules can be less marked if legislators follow party 
discipline. A single party can, for instance, capture both the 1/3 and the 2/5 legislators, in 
which case changing the rule from 2/3 to 3/5 may not have any consequence on the 
identification of the pivotal actors, the size of the equilibrium set and the efficiency of the 
expected outcomes. The probability that a single party can control the Veto legislators 
corresponding to different veto rules is higher the smaller the number of parties. In a two 
party system with party discipline, changing the threshold of the veto rule may have no 
effect, unless the relative sizes of the parties change significantly. Institutional designers 
should, thus, take into account the number of parties and the levels of party discipline 
(which highly depend on electoral rules) at the time of choosing congressional decision 
rules. In fact, changing the key electoral inducements of bipartism and party discipline may 
be much more effective to improve the efficiency of decision-making than changing certain 
congressional decision rules. 
The number of parties and their internal discipline at voting have revealed crucial to 
explain the effectiveness of institutions organized with separation of powers to make 
collectively satisfactory decisions. As specified in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 and the 
corresponding illustrations, the set of possible policy outcomes in equilibrium is smaller 
when party discipline does not matter than when it does. In the assumption of party 
discipline, the equilibrium set is smaller with a multiparty system than with a two party 
system (in the latter case the size of the equilibrium set always encompasses half 
legislators' preferences). Note that these results do not depend on the distribution of 
legislators' preferences along the policy spectrum but hold for any of these distributions. 
These formal findings may have important implications for applied analyses. They 
can explain, for instance, that policy decision-making in the United States can be expected 
to be more difficult and unsatisfactory when party discipline increases --as was recently the 
case in the 1994-1998 period, in which harsh inter -institutional confrontation and conflict 
culminated in the impeachment of the President. (See, for instance, Campbell and Rockman 
1999).  
Also, a summary survey of presidential democracies in Latin America suggests that 
two-party systems can be distinguished along this line: while in Argentina very strong party 
discipline has promoted bipolar confrontation and conflict, in Costa Rica and Uruguay 
relatively high levels of party indiscipline and fractionalization have favored smoother 
decision-making processes. In other Latin American countries multiparty systems prevail, 
with varied levels of party discipline. (For party systems in Latin America, Jones 1995, 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995; for measurements of party discipline in a number of 
countries, including the four above mentioned, Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 421-429 
and the corresponding country-chapters). 
The survival of presidential democracies could also be enlightened with insights 
from the present model. Democratic successes and breakdowns have been hypothetically 
associated to different (effective) numbers of  political parties, but empirical tests have not 
found conclusive evidence. In contrast, no systematic studies have yet developed that 
address the combined effect of the number of parties and their degree of discipline (or, for 
that matter, also the consequences of different veto rules), as suggested in the present paper.  
In the light of the analyses here presented, legislators' individual freedom and 
multipartism appear as favorable institutional conditions for effective decision-making and 
collectively satisfactory policy outcomes in a framework of separation of powers. This 
conclusion may be against the grain of the (not very abundant) comparative literature on 
this specific matter, but the opposite hypothesis may have been excessively influenced by 
(more numerous) analyses of desirable features in parliamentary regimes. Somehow, 
congressional fragmentation can be a lenitive for the difficulties in decision-making created 
by separation of powers, checks and balances, and qualified-majority decision rules –
features that do not exist in parliamentary regimes. The argument can also be presented the 
other way around, focusing on the disadvantages of having a small number of strongly 
disciplined parties: if there are only two of these parties, it will be difficult for the President 
to work out deals with the opposition, and adversarial politics and gridlock will flourish. 
Indeed decision-making in situations of divided government can be relatively contentious 
and inflict legislators' and executive officers' significant bargaining and other transaction 
costs (aspects that have not been included in the model). However, two party indiscipline, 
as well as multipartism, can make decision making easier, promote less partisan 
confrontation, be more compromising, and favor more consensual and collectively efficient 
decisions than the opposite features. 
 The last warning must be again on the effects of the electoral system. As 
mentioned, all the above analysis has focused on 'collective' utility or satisfaction of policy 
outcomes based on political representatives' preferences. But it may differ from a calculus 
of 'social' utility based on voters' preferences due to distorting effects of electoral rules. It 
may be the case that the relatively high efficiency of the United States institutional system 
of decision-making –as can be enlightened by the pivotal actors model-- is hurt by biases in 
representation of the electoral system, while, in other countries, more representative 
electoral systems do not culminate in producing socially satisfactory policy outcomes due 
to drawbacks of the institutional process of decision-making. But this would be the subject 
for another work. 
Notes 
 
1. See, among others, Hammond and Miller 1987, King and Ragsdale 1988, Riggs 1988, 
Sundquist 1988, Linz 1990, Cox and Kernell 1991, Mayhew 1991, Fiorina 1992, Riker 
1992, Shugart and Carey 1992, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Mainwaring 1993, Linz and 
Valenzuela 1994, Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, Jones 1995, Tsebelis 1995, Edwards, 
Barrett and Peake 1997, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Power and Gasiorowski 1997, 
Brady and Volden 1998, Nohlen and Fernández 1998, Colomer 2001, Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001, Lanzaro 2001. 
 
2. Legislative paralysis or 'gridlock' may result not only from a standoff between the 
median and the veto legislators, as analyzed in the present article, but also from 
coordination problems or high bargaining and other transaction costs which are not 
addressed here. It could be argued that disciplined parties internalize some transaction costs 
and therefore reduce their influence on legislative decisions. But the assumption of zero 
transaction costs adopted in the present model may not be very realistic for certain 
institutional settings. 
 
3. Krehbiel (1996: 27-32, and 1998: Chapter 8) himself discussed a possible extension of 
his analysis to settings with 'strong' parties. But he basically concluded that the explanation 
for lawmaking in the United States should "not to be found in a theory of party strength in 
legislatures" (1998: 185). Some of Krehbiel's analytical suggestions and insights are 
anyway taken for the present development. 
 
4. The meaning of 'discipline' should not be mistaken. Even with highly undisciplined 
parties, most legislators of the same party vote together most times, but this is due to the 
fact that many legislative decisions have low salience or attract wide consensus. The levels 
of indiscipline are relevant when legislators deal with salient or highly divisive issues.  
 
5. For further applications of the present analytical framework to other institutional settings, 
such as bicameral Congresses, an operative assumption would be that decisions are made 
not by simple majority but by some qualified majority rule, which can be equivalent to the 
requirement of simple majority in each of two politically non-congruent chambers. 
 
6. Regarding Krehbiel's original model as presented for the analysis of the U.S. Congress, I 
omit the Senate filibuster cloture rule, a very peculiar U.S. rule. 
 
7. However, the agenda setter can be decisive in order to select the policy issues on which 
decisions are going to be made, that is, to set the agenda in the narrowly literal sense of the 
term. 
 
8. An alternative formula, which will not be discussed in the following pages, could imply 
the imposition of non-median leaders' preferences on all party members, including, for 
instance, the relative common situation of externally moderate, internally authoritarian 
party leaders, as well as the possibility that a President may 'buy' support or 'punish' lack of 
cooperation from his own party members through the distribution or refusal of pork and 
patronage resources. Depending on whether the leader-induced party preference were more 
moderate or more extreme than the party's median member, this modification would 
decrease or increase, respectively, the size of the equilibrium set. 
 
9. The study of the United States Congress shows, however, that when the President's party 
has had a majority of seats, it has been more disciplined at voting than the minority party; 
see, for instance, King and Ragsdale 1988. 
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